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SITUATION II 
INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
Admitting that the Philippine Islands have been 
granted independence under the provisions of the pro-
posed Act of January 17, 1933/ ho'v should a seaplane 
of state X, \vhich is under its O\Vll po·wer and not de-
pendent upon any ship, be regarded and what should be 
its treabnent after arrival in the Port of Manila. 
(a) By the Philippine Govern1nent? 
(b) By the YanLba, a vessel of war of state Y which 
has been in l\1anila 20 hours~ 
( o) By the 1Va1nba, a vessel of 'var of state N, which 
is convoying Iner.chant vessels of neutral states? 
(d) By the Usa, a vessel of war of the United States~ 
SOLUTION 
1. In case the Philippine Islands obtain independence 
and are not neutralized : 
(a) The Philippine Governn1ent should intern the sea-
plane. 
(b) The Y aJtnba may request assurances from the 
Philippine Governn1ent to the effect that the seaplane 
has been or immediately will be interned. 
(c) The Nam~ba may inquire \vhether the seaplane has 
been or im1nediately is to be interned and may govern 
its movements accordingly. 
1 This act was rejected by resolution of the Philippine Legislature Octo-
ber 17, 1933, and the act of March 2,4, 1934, was accepted by a resolution 
of May 1, 193·4. These acts are p>rinted at the end of the discussion of 
this1 Situation II. See post pp. 111, 127. 
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(d) The Usa has no legal concern with the matter. 
2. In case the Philippine Islands are neutralized: 
(a) 'The Philippine Government should intern the 
seaplane. 
(b) If state Y is a party to the neutralization treaty, 
the Y a1nba may perform such services as rest upon that 
Yessel under the treaty but if state Y is not a party to 
the treaty, even though other states may be parties, the 
17 an~ba 1nay request assurances from the Philippine Gov-
ernment to the effect that the sea plane has been or inl-
nledia tely will be interned. 
(c) If state N is a party to the neutralization treaty, 
the N a1nba 1nay perforn1 such services as rest upon that 
vessel under the treaty but if state N is not a party to 
the treaty even though other states 1nay be parties, the 
J\T an~ba 1nay inquire 'vhether the seaplane has been or 
iinmediately is to be interned and 1nay govern its Inove-
ments accordingly. 
(d) If the Urrited States is, as 1nay be inferred fron1 
the Act of January 17, 1933, a party to the treaty of 
neutralization, the Usa 1nay perfor1n such services as rest 
upon that vessel under the treaty but if the United States 
is not a party, even though other states may be parties, 
the Usa has no legal concern 'vith the matter. 
NOTES 1 
Independence of Philippine Islands.-If section 10 of 
the Act of January 17, 1933, had been brought into effect 
by a favorable vote instead of being defeated by an un-
favorable vote, conditions 'vould have iinplied a consid-
erable change in the conduct of A1nerican affairs in the 
'vestern Pacific Ocean. By this act the Philippine Islands 
were to become "a separate and self-governing nation" 
and their officials 'vere to become " officers of the free and 
independent govern1nent of the Philippine Islands." The 
1 These notes were based upon the hypotheSis admitting independence 
under provisions of the act of January 17, 1033. Section 11, in regard 
to neutralization, is identical in the act of 1933 and in the act of 1934. 
NEUTRALIZATION 
President o:f the United States is requested at the earliest 
practicable date to open negotiations with :foreign powers 
looking to the perpetual neutralization o:f the Islands. 
This date might prestunably be as soon as the vote :favor-
able to independence under conditions o:f the 1933 act had 
been taken 'vith vie'v to launching the Common,vealth o:f 
the Philippine Islands as a perpetually neutralized state. 
Independence and neutralization.-By section 10 o:f the 
Act o:f January 17, 1933, the independence o:f the Philip-
pine Islands 'vas to be recognized 10 years a:fter the new 
govern1nent under the constitution should be set up and 
all sovereignty o:f the United States was to be withdrawn. 
Under section 12, the President o:f the United States was 
to invite other states to recognize the independence o:f 
the Islands. This independence does not seem to be de-
pendent upon the neutralization o:f the Islands though 
the 'vording ·o:f section 11 seems to anticipate that the 
negotiation o:f a neutralization ~reaty may precede inde-
pendence. By this section, the President is requested 
"at the earliest practicable date " to negotiate :for neu-
tralization, "i:f and vvhen Philippine independence shall 
have been achieved." 
Situation II 1nay there:fore be considered :from t'vo 
points o:f vie,v, i.e., the Philippine Islands may be inde-
pendent and neutralized or the Philippine Islands may 
be independent but not neutralized. 
Neutralization agree1nents.-N eutralization agree-
ments have long been common and o:ften have been re-
garded as satisfactory methods o:f solving perplexing or 
otherwise insolvable difficulties. Broadly these agree-
ments have been unilateral or multilateral, i.e., one or • 
more states have signed an agreement to the effect that 
each would respect the neutrality o:f a named area or 
entity, or states have agreed with one another that they 
would maintain the neutrality o:f a named area or entity. 
N eutraliz(J)tion.-Some type of neutralization has o:ften 
been resorted to when a state or states may be uncertain 
as to the immediate policy to be pursued in regard to the 
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subject of neutralization. Often there has been created 
by the adoption of the phrase in conventional frame-
work a sense of security which subsequent events have 
sho,vn to be visionary. Like other international agree-
ments, however, the relations depend upon the na-
ture of the obligations assumed. Many of the treaties 
and conventions providing for neutralization fix the 
period as " in perpetuity ", " forever ", "lasting ", etc. 
A review of these treaties sho,vs that these 'vords have 
been very loosely used. Even the clause of the Treaty 
of Vienna, 1815, relating to neutralization 'vas not 
strictly observed. The provisions were that " the town 
of Craco'v, with its territory, is declared to be forever 
a free, independent, and strictly neutral city, under the 
protection of Austria, Russia and Prussia", 'vith the 
further provision that " the Courts of Russia, Austria, 
and Prussia engage to respect and to cause to be always 
respected, the neutrality of the free town of Cracow and 
its territory." The action of these powers in 1846 in 
annexing this territory to Austria showed that such . 
ter1ns as " forever " and " al 'va ys " 'ver;e not to be taken 
ljterally. Action under other similar treaties sho,vs that 
"perpetual" and like 'vords used in neutralization 
agreen1ents i1nplies that no predetermined date has been 
fixed upon for termination of the neutralized status and 
little more. It is a fact that S-witzerland has been con-
sidered as neutralized and that at Paris, N ove1nber 20, 
1815, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and 
Russia, ackno,vledged, "in the 1nost formal 1nanner, by 
the present act that the neutrality and inviolability of 
s,vitzerland and her independence of all foreign in-
fluence, enter into the true interests of the policy ot the 
\Vhole of Europe." s,vitzerland has, ho,vever, froln tin1e 
to time as wars arose infor1ned the foreign powers that 
the government 'vould " 1naintain and defend " her neu-
trality by all the n1eans in her po,ver and s,vitzerland 
bas ordinarily had a 'veil-trained army. 
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Luxemburg neutralized under the Great Powers in 
1867 and 'vithout defenses "ras a n1atter of controversy 
during the Franco-Prussian 'Var, 1870, and overrun dur-
ing the 'V orld vV ar, troops entering as early as August 
2, 1914. Lord Stanley, 'vho had participated in the 
negotiation of the treaty in regard to the neutralization 
of Luxe1nburg, said of the obligation, " Such a guarantee 
has obYiously rather the character of a moral sanction to 
the arrangements which it defends than that of a con-
tingent liability to make war." 
In the treaty of 1831 in regard to Belgiu1n, it was 
agreed that it " shall for1n an independent and per-
petually neutral state " and this was reaffirmed in 1839. 
In the Franco-Prussian 'Var, however, Great Britain 
made treaties 'vith France and with Prussia to the effect 
that if either should violate Belgian territory, Great Bri-
tain 'vould for the defense of Belgium go in on the side of 
the other. 'Vhether the simple In oral sanction would have 
been sufficient to secure respect for the Belgian neutrality 
seen1s at least to have been doubted by the three po,vers 
parties to these treaties of 1870. Their doubts seen1 to 
have been justified by events of 1914. 
It 'Yould see1n fro1n instances of neutralization that the 
risks consequent upon violation of neutralization agree-
Inents should be at least co1nn1ensurate to the advan-
tages 'vhich might be anticipated fro1n disregard of 
these agreements as such sanctions only have proven 
effective. 
Belgian position, 1914.-Belgium 'vas in early 1914 
under the provisions of the neutralization treaty, but 
had· maintained an army and fortifications. The note 
communicated to the German Minister by the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Davignon, on August 3, 
1914, at 7 a.m. shows the official attitude to,vard the 
condition that had arisen as follo,vs : 
The Gern1an Government stated in their note of August 2, 1914, 
that according to reliable information French forces intended to 
march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, 
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in spite of the best intentions, 'vould not be in a position to 
repulse, 'vithout assistance, an advance of French troops. 
The Gennan Government, therefore, considered then1selves 
compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian terri-
tory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian 
·Govern1nent to adopt a friendly attitude toward her, and under-
took, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the 
Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added 
that if Belgium put difficulties in the 'vay of the advance· of 
Gennan troops, Germany 'vould be con1pelled to consider her us 
.an enemy, and to leave the ultin1ate adjustinent of the relations 
between the two States to the decision of arms. 
This note has 1nade a deep and painful impression upon the 
.Belgian Government. 
The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in con-
tradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in 
the name of the French Government. 
l\1oreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality 
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her inter-
national obligations and the Belgian arm;y 'vould offer the most 
vigorous resistance to the invader. 
The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch 
for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guar-
antee of the po,vers, and notably of the Government of His 
Majesty the I{ing of Prussia. 
Belgium has always been faithful to her international obliga-
tions, she J:?.as carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal imparti-
ality and she has left nothing undone to n1aintain and enforce 
respect for her neutrality. 
The attack upon her independence ·with which the German 
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of inter-
national la,v. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of 
law. 
The Belgian Government, if they 'vere to accept the proposals 
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and 
betray their duty toward Europe. 
Conscious of the part 'vhich Belgium has played for more · than 
-80 years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe 
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the 
price of the violation of her neutrality. 
If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are fir1nly 
resolved to repel, by all the m·eans in their power, every attack 
llpon their rights. (1917 Naval "\Var College, International Law 
T>ocuments, p. 53.) 
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The next day the Ger1nan l\1inister was handed his 
passports and the British, French, and Russian · minis-
ters \Vere " as guaranteeing po,vers " requested to coop-
erate in the defense of Belgian territory. 
On August 4, all Belgian diplon1atic representatives 
abroad \Vere instructed to bring the action of their gov-
ern1nent to the attention of the states to \vhich they 
\Yere accredited. 
A few days later the hope \vas officially expressed 
that the regin1e of neutralization \Vould be pern1itted to 
continue in the Belgian dependencies in Africa partic-
ularly referring to the General Act of the Berlin Con-
ference signed )j.,ebruary 26, 1885, and article 11. 
"\Vhen the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war was 
receiYed, the Belgian Govern1nent replied, August 29, 
1914, in a 1nanner showing recognition of Belgian obli-
gations under the treaty of neutralization, saying, 
Belgiu1n has always entertained friendly relations 'vith all 
her neighbors without distinction. She had scrupulously ful-
filled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she 
has not been able to accept Gern1any's proposals, it is because 
these proposals contemplated the Yiolation of her engagements 
toward Europe, engagements which forn1 the conditions of the 
creation of the Belgian l(ingclom. She has been unable to admit 
that a people, boweYer weak they may be, can fail in their duty 
and sacrifice their honor by ~yielding to force. The government 
lun·e waited, not only until the ultimatun1 had expired, but also 
until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, 
before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantorF' of her 
neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-
Hungary, to cooperate in the na1ne and in virtue of the treaties 
in defense of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by 
force of arn1s, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid 
down by the provisions of article 10 of the Hague Convention 
respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers. 
Gernu1ny herself has recognized that her attack constitutes 
a violation of international law, nnd, being unable to justify it, 
she has pleaded her strategical interests. 
Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hun-
garian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgiun1 contrary 
to the 1nost primitive demands of humanity. (Ibid., p. 58.) 
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Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.-As under 
section 11 of the Act of January 17, 1933, the President 
of the United States is requested to enter upon negotia-
tions for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, 
the American Government would naturally be supposed 
to have a plan to suggest and to be prepared to become a 
party to the " perpetual neutralization." The negotia-
tion is not by the Act restricted to any specified powers 
but would seem to imply that the invitation to negoti-
ate might be to all powers desiring to take part in 
the negotiation, at least, the po,vers Inentioned in sec-
tion 12, viz: those in diplomatic correspondence with the 
United States 'vould expect to be invited as these are to 
be invited to recognize the independence of the Philip-
pine Islands when it is attained. 
There would be certain complications owing to exist-
ing treaties in regard to relations in the ·western Pacific. 
The Washington Conference of 1921-22 'vas not merely 
upon limitation of armament but also according to the 
official agenda upon Pacific and Far Eastern questions. 
It was recognized in this Conference that naval power 
1night be conditioned on other factors than ships and 
article XIX of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament 
contained the follo,ving provisions : 
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that 
the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, 
with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained 
in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder. 
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds 
or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those 
adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama 
Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the 
Ha-waiian Islands ; 
(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British 
Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, 
east of the meridian of 110° east longitude; except (a) those 
adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Conunonwealth of Aus-
traHa and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand; 
( 3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan 
in the Pacific Ocean, to wit; the l{urile Islands, the Bonin Islands, 
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Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, 
and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean 
which Japan may hereafter acquire. 
The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing pro-
visions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be 
established iil the territories and possessions specified; that no 
measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for 
the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase 
shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and pos-
sessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not pre-
clude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equip-
ment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time 
of peace. (1921 Naval "\Var College, International Law Docu-
nlents, p. 301.) 
If the neutralization of the Philippine Islands takes 
place, it \vill evidently be of an area of which the military 
status is already subject to international restriction. 
Subject to these restrictions the Philippine Islands \vould 
be unable to establish any very strong military po\ver. 
The \vithholding of the military and naval bases limited 
to the strength of February 6, 1921, \Vould scarcely be of 
great value to the United States as these areas would be 
open to attack and occupation by any enemy in time of 
war \vhile adjacent Philippine areas \vould be neutralized. 
A1ne1'·ican co1n1nitJnents in the Philippines.-Under 
article 3 of the Treaty of 1898, Spain ceded to the United 
States the Philippine Islands and the United States paid 
Spain $20,000,000. Under other articles of this treaty 
Spanish ships and 1nerchandise were for a period of 
ten years to be achnitted to the Islands on the sa1ne terms 
as American, the return of prisoners of \Var and disposi-
tion of other persons \Vere provided for, outstanding 
claims were allocated, and all public properties of Spain 
such as buildings, \Yharves, military structures, public 
highways, and other immovable property passed to the 
United States. 
At the Washington Conference of Limitation of Naval 
Armament, 1921, Japan wished assurances as to the at-
titude of the United States and Great Britain to\vard 
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jncrease of :fortifications and na Yal bases in the Pacific. 
After discussion, article XIX, 1nentioned above, was in-
bertecl in the Treaty Li1niting Naval Arma1nent. Ho'v 
far such a restriction would be embodied in any agr.ee-
ment setting up a Philippine state should be a matter of 
careful consideration. 
Under the Act of January 17, 1933, the proposal of 
section 5 'vas that " land or other property " which had 
been designated by the President of the United States 
for military and other reservations of the Govern1uent 
of the United States should not pass to the Philippine 
Governn1ent, and 1nay be redesignated by the President 
\vi thin 2 years after the procla1nation of withdrawal of 
the sovereignty of the United States. I£ neutralization 
should take place under section 11 of the Act, the value 
to the United States of military bases in the status quo of 
1922 in a foreign state 'vould be doubtful. 
Neutralization of Panam£a Canal.-ln the prea1nble of 
the treaty bet-ween the United States and Great Britain, 
1901, regarding the Panama Canal 1nention is 1nade of 
the "general principle" of neutralization and in article 
3 this is referred to as substantially that " embodied in 
the Convention of. Constantinople, signed the 28th Oc-
tober, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal," 
VIZ: 
1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce 
and of 'var of all nations obserYing these rules, on terms of en-
tire equality so that there shall be no discrimination against any 
such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the condi-
tions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and 
charges of traffic shall be just and equitable. 
2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of 
war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed "'ithin 
it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain 
sueh military police along the canal as may be necessary to pro-
tect it against lawlessness and disorder. 
3. Vessels of war of a bellige·rent shall not revictual nor take 
any stores in the canal except so far as nul.y be strictly necessary; 
and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected 
with the least possible delay in accordanse with the regulation~ 
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in force , and with only such intermission as may result from the 
necessities of the service. 
Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as 
vessels of war of the belligerents. 
4. No belligerent shall en1bark or disembark troops, munitions 
of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case- of acci-
dental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall 
be resumed with all possible dispatch. 
5. The proYisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent 
to the canal, within 3 marine 1niles of either end. Vessels of war 
of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than 24 
hours at any one tilne, except in case of distress, and in such case, 
shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one bel-
ligerent shall not depart within 24 hours from the departure of a 
vessel of war of the other belligerent. 
6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all work necessary 
to the construction, nutintenance, and operation of the canal shall 
be deenwd to be part thereof, for the purposes of this treaty, and 
in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity 
from attack or injury by beiligerents, and from acts calculated to 
impair their usefulness as part of the canal. ( 32 U .S.Stat., Pt. II, 
pp. 1903, 1904.) (1929 NaYal 'Var College, International Law Sit-
uations, p. 22.) 
LVe·utralization of Aaland Islands; 1921.-0ne of the 
n1ore recent conventions relating to neutralization was 
that in regard to the Aaland Islands signed by the states 
bordering on the Baltic and by British and Italian 
representatives, October 22, 1921. This convention, 
which defines the area of the Aaland Islands in article 
2, had as its object " the nonfortification and neutraliza-
tion of the Aalancl Islands in order that these islands 
1nay never beco1ne a cause of danger from the 1nilitary 
point of vie\v " and for the 1naintenance of this ai1n the 
po\vers n1ay individually or jointly ask the Council of 
the League of Nations to decide upon the 1neasures to be 
taken and the parties to the convention agree to assist 
in these n1easures. The method of determining upon the 
1neasures was outlined as follows: 
'Vhen, for the purposes of tl!is undertaking, the Council is 
called upon to make a decision under the above conditions, it 
will inYite the Po,vers which are parties to the present ConYen-
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tion, whether l\fen1bers of the League or not, to sit on the 
Council. The vote of the representative of the Po\Ver accused of 
having violated the provisions of this Convention shall not be 
necessary to constitute the unanhnity required for the Council's 
decision. 
If unanin1ity cannot be obtained, each of the High Contracting 
Parties shall be entitled to take any 1neasures which the Council 
by a two-thirds 1najority recommends, the vote of the representa· 
tive of the Power accused of having violated the provisions of 
this Convention not being counted. (1924 Naval "\Var College, 
International Law Docun1ents, p. 59.) 
That the high contracting parties " undertake to as-
sist " or are " entitled to take any measures 'vhich the 
Council by a t"\vo-thirds 1najority recommends" does not 
necessarily co1n1nit any of the high contracting parties 
to any predetermined action as, these po,vers 'vould be 
n1e1nbers of the council for deciding the measures to be 
taken. 
The Aaland Islands re1nain an integral part of the 
Republic of Finland and Finland may take 1neasures for 
the defense of the neutrality of the islands and of the 
Finnish 1nainland in case of sudden attack and pending 
intervention by the high contracting parties under tern1s 
of the convention. 
Civ-il and military aircraft.-In 1919 a convention for 
the regulation of aerial navigation was signed at Paris. 
The general prov]sions of this convention have been ap-
proved and have been embodied in other agreen1ents and 
proposed agreements. Distinction 'vas made between 
private and state aircraft and also in the categories of 
state aircraft. Son1e restrictions were also imposed 
upon aircraft. 
ART. 30. The following shall be deemed to be State aircraft: 
(a) Military aircraft. 
(b) Aircraft exclusively en1ployed in State service·, such as 
posts, custon1s, police. 
Every other aircraft shall be deen1ed to be a private aircraft. 
All state aircraft other than n1ilitary, customs and police air-
craft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be 
subject to all the provisions of the present Convention. 
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ART. 31. Eve-ry air<:'#aft c01n1nanded by a person in military 
service detailed for the purpose s:Qall be deemed to be a military 
aircraft. 
ART. 32. No military aircraft of a contracting State shall fly 
over the territory of another contracting State nor land thereon 
without special authorisation. In case of such authorisation the 
military aircraft shall enjoy, in principle, in the absence of 
special stipulation the privileges which are customarily accorded 
to foreign ships of war. 
A military aircraft which is forced to land or which is re-
que~ted or sumn1oned to land shall by reason thereof acquire no 
right to the privileges referred to in the above paragraph. 
ARr. 33. Special arrangements between the States concerned 
will determine in what cases police and custoins aircraft may be 
authorised to cross the frontier. They shall in no case be en-
titled to the privileges referred to in Article· 32. (XI League of 
Nations Treaty Series, p. 173 ( 1922) . ) 
These principles, some,vhat elaborated, :formed a part 
o:f the rules dra,vn up at The Hague in 1923 as is stated 
in the report o:f the Com1nission. It was recognized, 
ho,vever, that "a clear distinction must be n1ade between 
aircra:ft that :form a part o:f the co1nbatant :forces in time 
o:f war and those which do not." Accordingly a rule 
'vas dra,vn up as article 3 that "A 1nilitary aircra:ft shall 
bear an external n1ark indicating its nationality and mil-
itary character " while article 5 stated, "Public non-mil-
itary aircra:ft other than those employed :for customs or 
police purposes shall in time o:f vvar bear the same ex-
ternalinarks, and :for the purposes o:f these rules shall be 
treated on the same :footing, as private aircra:ft." (1924 
Naval vVar College, International Law Documents, p. 
110.) 
Seaplanes and neut1"al waters.-It is admitted in all 
proposed regulations that aircra:ft in distress 1nay enter 
neutral jurisdiction. Red Cross aircra:ft are also per-
Initted to enter, as are aircra:ft on board ships o:f war. 
It has :further been generally held that an aircra:ft 
taking off :from a vessel o:f war 'vithin neutral 'vaters or 
entering the neutral aerial jurisdiction is liable to intern-
ment. 
73500-34--5 
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The report of the Commission of Jurists at The Hague, 
in 1923, stated that, 
The obligation on the part of the neutral Power to intern covers 
not only the aircraft, but its equipment and contents. The obli-
gation is not affected by the circumstances which led to the mili-
tary aircraft coming within the jurisdiction. It applies whether 
the belligerent aircraft entered neutral jurisdiction, Yoluntarily 
or involuntarily, and whatever the cause. It is an obligation owed 
to the opposing belligerent and is based upon the fact that the 
aircraft has co1ne into an area where it is not subject to attack 
by its opponent. * * * 
The obligation to intern belligerent military aircraft entering 
neutral jurisdiction entails also the obligation to intern the per-
sonnel. These will in general be combatant 1nembers of the bel-
ligerent fighting forces, but experience has already shown that in 
time of war military aeroplanes are employed for transporting 
passen·gers. As it may safely be assun1ed that in time of war a 
passenger would not be carried on a belligerent military aircraft 
unless his journey was a matter of importance to the Government, 
it seems reasonable also to comprise such passengers in the cate-
gory of persons t? be interned. 
"ARTICLE 42. 
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal to 
prevent the entry 'vithin its jurisdiction of belligerent military 
q.ircraft and to compel them to alight if they have entered such 
\urisdiction. 
"A neutral Government shall use the means at its disposal, to 
intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its juris-
diction after having alighted for any reason whatsoever, together 
with its crew and the passengers, if any." (1924 Naval 'Var Col-
lege, International Law Documents, p. 133.) 
Article 46 of these rules speaks of " departure by air 
of any aircraft." Whether a seaplane arriving and de-
parting by water would receive different treabnent is not 
stated. It 1night be queried 'vhether aerial or n1ariti1ne 
navigation is the auxiliary or principal fact in use of a 
hydroplane. Article 42 apparently is drawn with refer-
ence to aircraft which in flight enter neutral jurisdic-
tion, though the second paragraph might strictly be ex-
tended to a seaplane 'vhich had alighted outside and 
navigated 'vithin neutral jurisdiction. 
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. Gern~an protest to United' States, 1915.-In a com-
Jnunication of the Ger1nan Ambassador, J. Bernstorff, 
of January 19, 1915, to the Secretary of State, there 
\Yas mentioned certain data which the Ambassador un-
derstood to be reliable in regard to hy_dro-aeroplanes. In 
concluding, the Ambassador said, 
There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regarded as 
war vessels whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals 
should be stopped under Article 8 of the thirteenth convention 
of the Seconu Hague Conference of October 18, 1907. [Art. 8. A 
neutral Government is bound to employ the 1neans at its disposal 
to preYent the fitting out or arming of every v~essel within its 
jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, 
or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that 
Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same 
vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of every 
vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which 
has been, within the said jurisdiction, adapted, entirely or in 
part, for use in war.] Hydro-aeroplanes are not mentioned by 
name in the convention simply because there was none in 1907 
at the time of the conference. 
On the supposition that hydro-aeroplanes are delivered to 
belligerents against the 'vishes of the Government of the United 
States, I have the honor to bring the foregoing to your excel-
lency's kind knowledge. (1915 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supple-
ment, p. 776.) 
To this communication the Secretary of State 1nade a 
somewhat full reply on January 29, 1915: 
ExcELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your excellency's note of the 19th instant, and in reply have 
to inform you that the statements contained in your excellency's 
note have received my careful consideration in view of the earnest 
purpose of this Government to perfor1n every duty which is im-
posed upon it as a neutral by treaty stipulation and international 
Jaw. 
The essential statement i~ your note, which implies an obliga-
tion on the part of this Government to interfere in the sale and 
delivery of hydro-aeroplanes to belligerent powers, is: 
"There is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be regardert as 
war vessels whose delivery to belligerent states by neutrals should 
be stopped unde'r Article 8 of the thirteenth convention of the 
Second Hague Conference of October 18, 1907." 
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As to this assertion of the character of hydro-aeroplanes I 
submit the following comn1ents: The fact that a hydro-aeropiane 
is fitted with apparatus to rise from and alight upon the sea 
does not in my opinion give it the character of a vessel any n1ore 
than the wheels attached to an aeroplane fitting it to rise from 
and alight upon land give the latter the character of a land ve-
hicle. Both the hydro-aeroplane and the aeroplane are essen-
tially aircraft; as an aid in military operations they can only 
be used in the air. The fact that one starts its flight from the 
surface of the sea and the other from the land is a mere inci-
dent which in no way affects their aerial character. 
In view of these facts I must. dissent from your excellency's 
assertion that " there is no doubt that hydro-aeroplanes must be 
regarded as war vessels," and consequently I do not regard the 
obligations imposed by treaty or by the accepted rules of inter-
national law applicable to aircraft of any sort. 
In this connection I further call to your excellency's attention 
that according to the latest advices received by this Department 
the German Imperial Government include "balloons and flying 
rnachines and their component parts" in the list of conditional 
contraband, and that in the Imperial prize ordinance, drafted 
Septernber 30, 1909, and issued in the Reichs-Gesetzbla tt on 
August 3, 1914, appear as conditional contraband " airships and 
flying machines" (Article 23, section 8). It thus appears that 
the Imperial Government have placed and still retain aircraft 
of all descriptions in the class of conditional contraband, for 'vhich 
no special treatment involving neutral duty is, so far as I arn 
advised, provided by any treaty to which the United States is a 
signatory or adhering power. 
As in the views of this Department the provisions of Convention 
XIII of the Second Hague Conference do not apply to hydro-
aeroplanes I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question 
as to whether those provisions are in force during the present 
war. (Ibid., p. 780.) 
Probably the statement of the Secretary of State that 
he did "not regard the obligations i~mposed by treaty or 
by the accepted rules of international law applicable to 
aircraft of any sort" 'vas to be taken merely as en1pha-
sizing his interpretation of neutral obligations as re-
gards this particular case rather than as regards all 
possible cases. 
Analogy of aerial and 1nariti1n-e rules.-· It has often 
been 1naintained that aerial and 1naritiine rules should 
DUE DILIGENCE AND AIRCRAFT 63 
be the san1e. ~Iany of these ideas are due to the use for 
aircraft of the sa1ne 'vords and phrases that are used for 
1narine craft. Such 'vords as ships, navigation, landing, 
pilots, registry, papers, right-of-w·ay, etc., are in the ma-
rine and aerial vocabularies but the application 1nay be 
quite unlike. 
1'he analogy fails 'vhen consideration is given to the 
nature of ships of the sea and of the air, speed and 
range of navigation, place of landing, use of pilots, etc. 
These differences must be taken into the reckoning when 
the responsibility of the neutral is to be estimated even 
under the rule of clue diligence. 
D·ue d-iligence as to airc1~aft.-The rule requiring of a 
neutral state exercise of clue diligence in n1aintaining 
its neutrality has been interpreted as obliging the neutral 
state to use the "Ineans at its disposal." If the inter-
pretation put upon the 'vords, "due diligence", in the 
Alaban1a case, i.e. diligence in "exact proportion to the 
risks 'vhich either of the belligerents 1nay be exposed 
fro1n failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality '' is 
to be applied to aircraft, the safe rule 'vould be to pro-
hibit under liability to intern1nent the entrance of air-
era ft to neutral jurisdiction. 
The risk fro1n the entrance to neutral territory of bel-
ligerent land forces entails internment for the period of 
the war. Under certain conditions the internn1ent of 
vessels of a belligerent 1nay be necessary in order that 
neutrality may be Inaintained but ordinarily the n1ove-
1nents of vessels are sufficiently under control so that 
neither belligerent is prejudiced unduly if a degree of 
equality in granting privileges essential to keep the ves-
sels sea,vorthy is granted. The risk fro1n aircraft is 
relatively so n1uch greater that the neutral has forbidden 
entrance to neutral jurisdiction under penalty of intern-
Inent except to hospital aircraft. 
Naval War 0 ollege opinion, 191~.-\V'hile aircraft had 
been only moderately developed before 1912, the Naval 
\V' ar College had given attention to certain aspects of 
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aerial navigation. In referring to the analogy of taking 
coal for naval vessels and gas for balloons, in the Situa-
tions for 1912 it was said, 
Even with this extension of the right of coaling, the entrance 
of a balloon into neutral territory may be in n1arkecl contrast to 
the entrance of a v·essel of war into a neutral port. One bellig-
erent may easily learn of the entrance of a vessel of his enemy 
to a neutral port. The course which the vessel will follow on 
departure, the time of sojourn, and other facts may be reasonably 
determined. A vessel in a neutral port Inust ordinarily put to 
sea before reaching a home or an enemy port. A belligerent would 
ordinarily, therefore have an opportunity to meet and to engage 
the vessel of his opponent in an area where battle is lawful and 
without material risk to the neutral. 
It is possible, however, that the territory of States might be so 
situated that a neutral State might be directly between the t'vo 
belligerents; e.g., if war existed between Germany and Spain. 
In such a case would the bringing of a vvar balloon to the French 
frontier fron1 Germany place France under any obligation to per-
mit the balloon to enter and take the necessary gas to make it 
navigable? If German balloons were pennitted to enter French 
territory, take gas, and from points of advantage attack Spanish 
forces and territory, would such permission by France be analogous 
to the entrance of German troops, or would it be the use of 
French territory as a base? "\Vhether or not the right of absolute 
sovereignty in the air is in the subjacent State, certainly France 
vvoulcl be under no obligation to receive a Gennan war balloon 
into its territory when France is neutral except on ground of 
humanity or vis 1najor. France could scarcely pennit German 
war balloons to use French territory as a point from which to 
attack Spain, and ·if German forces should enter French territory 
internment would be the penalty. (1921 Naval 'Var College, In-
ternational Law Situations, p. 85.) 
It 'vas at that time pointed out that the situation would 
be n1odified if the aircraft 1naintained continuous physi-
cal contact and was appurtenant to a cruiser or si1nilar 
vessel. 
II ague rtttles, 19£3.-The Con1n1ission of Jurists to 
Consider and Report upon the Rules of \Varfare 'vhich 
'vas appointed under provisions of a resolution of the 
"\Vashington Conference of 1922 reported upon radio and 
aircraft in 1923. In this report it 'vas said, 
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No attempt has been made to formulate a definition of the 
term "aircraft," nor to enumerate the various categories of 
n1achines which are covered by the term. A statement of the 
broad principle that the rules adopted apply to all types of air-
craft has been thought sufficient, and article 1 has been framed 
for this purpose. 
"ARTICLE 1 
"The rules of aerial \Yarfare apply to all aircraft, whether 
lighter or heavier than air, irrespective of whether they are, or 
are not, capable of floating on the water." (1924 Naval \Var 
College, Int. Law Documents, p. 108.) 
'Vhile these rules have not been ratified, they em-
bodied the opinion of the delegates from six naval 
powers and are therefore worthy of careful considera-
tion. 
Dependent aircraft.-It has gradually become cus-
toJnary to add to the naval fighting forces aircraft car-
riers or vessels having facilities for carriage of aircraft. 
For so1ne years it had generally been the rule that such 
aircraft should be regarded while on the sh 1 p as part 
of the ship. This 1natter had been considered at The 
Hague in 1923 and the Report of the Commission ex-
plains that, 
The customary rules of international law authorise the adinis-
sion of belligerent warships to neutral ports and waters. There 
is no obligation upon neutral States to admit warships belong-
ing to belligerent States, but it is not in general refused. The 
admission of belligerent military aircraft, however, is prohibited 
by article 40, and account 1nust therefore be taken of the fact 
that it has now become the practice for warships to have a 
certain nu1nber of aircraft assigned to them and that these 
aircraft usually rest on board the \varship. 'Vhile they remain 
on board the warship they form part of it, and should be re-
garded as such fr01n the point of view of the regulations issued 
by the neutral States. They will therefore be allowed to enter 
the neutral jurisdiction on the same footing as the warship on 
board \Yhich they rest, but they n1ust remain on board the 
warship and 1nust not commit any act which t~e \Varship is not 
allowed to comn1it. 
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"ARTICLE 41. 
"Aircraft on board vessel of war, including aircraft-can:iers, 
shall be regarded as part of such vessels." (1924 Naval 'Var 
College, Int. Law Documents, p. 131.) 
Aircraft over neutral jurisdiction.-The practice and 
general opinion before the. end of the World "'\Var sup-
ported the right of a neutral state to exclude all bellig-
erent aircraft fron1 the air above its land. Aircraft 
were generally excluded from air above the land by proe-
lama tion or decree of some kind. The early or dina nee 
of Switzerland, August 4, 1914, was explicit as to the 
right of the s,viss Govern1nent to control this aerial 
space. 
17. As to aviation, attention will be given to what folliJws: 
(a) Balloons. and air craft not belonging to the Swiss Array 
can not rise and navigate in the aerial space situated above our 
territory unless the persons ascending in the apparatus are 
furnished with a special authorization, delivered in the territory 
occupied by the anny, by the conunander of the anny : in the 
rest of the country, by the Federal military department: 
(b) The passage of all balloons and air craft con1ing frmn 
abroad into our aerial space is forbidden. It will be oppos<~cl if 
necessary by all available 1neans and these air craft will he 
controlled whenever that appears aclvantageous. 
(c) In case of the landing of foreign balloons or air craft, their 
passengers will be conducted to the nearest superior Inilitary c\nn-
mander who will act according to his instructions. The ap-
paratus and the articies which it contains ought, in any case, 
to be seized by the Inilitary authorities or the police. The Ft)d-
ernl Inilitary deparbnent or the conunander of the army will de-
cide what ought to be done with the personnel and Inaterial of 
a balloon or air craft cOining into our territory through force 
1najeure and when there appears to be no reprehensible inten-
tion or negligence. (1916 Naval 'Var College, International Law 
Topics, p. 73.) 
The Procla1nation of the United States in regarc1 to 
the Panama Canal Zone and the cities and harbors of 
Panama and Colon was con1prehensive: 
Rule 16.-Air craft of a belligerent power, public or private, 
are forbidden to descend' or arise within the jurisdiction of the 
United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air 
INTERNMENT 67 
spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdic-tion. 
(1915 Naval \Var College, International Law Topics, p. 14.) 
I nt&nmen.t.-Interninent of vessels of vvar is a rela-
tively 1nodern practice. It first became generally recog-
nized in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. The 
Hague Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Po,vers in lVIaritin1e Law of 1907, Article 24, 
stated the right of intern1nent and outlined the proce-
dure of intern1nent. Provision vvas made for interning 
vessels of vvar in n1any of the neutrality proclan1ations 
and regulations during the 'Vorld "\Var. 
The analogous principle had been earlier a ppliecl to 
belligerent land fo,rces entering upon neutral territory. 
rrhe interninent of aircraft unless attached to a vessel 
vvas the rule during the \V orld 'V ar and prohibitions of 
flight over neutral jurisdiction 'vere com1non as in the 
Italian decree of Septen1ber 3, 1914. 
ARTIOLE 1. It is forbidden for any apparatus or means of aerial 
locomotion, such as dirigibles, aeroplanes, hydroplan~s. balloons, 
flying kites, or captive balloons, etc., to fly or as~Putl over any 
points of territory of the state or colonies or of the territorial 
seas, except for those established by 1nilitary authorities and for 
otller aeronautics that are authorized fron1 tilne to time by the 
1ninisters of war and navy. No pennission will be granted to 
any foreigners. 
Air'craft and outbreak of 1VorZd W ar.-When the Ger-
Inan A1nbassador 'vithdre'v fro1n Paris, August 3, 1914, 
he said in his letter to the President of the Council, M. 
Viviani: 
The German adn1inistrative and n1ilitary authorities have 
established a certain nu1nber of flagrantly hostile acts com1nitted 
on German territory by French military aviators. Several of 
these have openly violated: the neutrality of Belgium by flying 
over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy 
buildings near \Vesel ; others have been seen in the district of 
the Eifel; one has thrown bmnbs on the railway near Carlsruhe 
and Nuremberg. 
I a1n instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excel-
lency that in the presence of these acts of aggression the Ger-
Inan Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in 
consequence of the acts of this latter power. (1917 Naval \Var 
College, International Law Documents, p, 103.) 
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In the reply M. Viviani said, 
I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Am-
bassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday 
addressed to him · a note- protesting against the flagrant viola-
tions of the French frontier committed two days ago by detach-
ments of Gern1an troops. (French Yellow Book, No. 148.) 
Proclamation of United States, February ~8, 1918.-
Soon after the United States entered the World War as a 
belligerent, it found problems arising from the use of 
aircraft and on February 28, 1918, a proclamation was 
issued requiring license from government authorities for 
any person flying over certain areas, and no private flying 
was to be permitted after 30 days from February 28. ( 40 
U.S.Stat., Pt. 2, 1753). The presumption would under 
such circumstances be that all aircraft of the registry of 
the United States would from that date be public air-
craft and liable to be treated accordingly. 
Spaight's opinion.-J. M. Spaight who has given much 
attention to laws relating to aircraft gives certain prac-
tical arguments for refusal of entrance to belligerent 
aircraft within neutral jurisdiction. 
The pre-,var argument for refusing to belligerent aircraft the 
right to circulate in neutral atmosphere, namely, that such a 
right must be accorded to both or neither of the belligerents, and 
that if accorded to both there must always be the danger of con-
flicts above neutral soil, with consequent danger to life and prop-
erty below, received a concrete confirmation in an occurrence of 
the war. In December, 1917, it was reported that an ael'ial coin-
cat took place over Swiss territory, and that as a result a good 
deal of damage was caused near l\1uttenz by the fall of bombs. 
Other combats also occurred over neutral territory-over Aarden-
burg (Zeeland), for instance, in January, 1918; over Cadzand in 
April, 1918; and over Ameland in July, 1918. The fact that such 
incidents can occur is the best answer to the question which has 
been asked-,Vhy should not the maritime rule of entry of neutral 
jurisdiction apply to aircraft? The a.nswer is, in brief, that the 
circumstances are dissimilar, and that the practical objections to 
allowing entry of aircraft outweight any advantages that 'vould 
result fron1 applying the naval rule. The question has often been 
considered, and the general conclusion has been in favour of 
prohibition of entry. ( Spaight, Air Power and "Tar Rights, 2d 
ed., p. 422.) 
RULE OF SOJOURN 69 
nir. Spaight also adds that exceptions to the prohibi-
tion of entrance should not be made and were not 
n1ade on account of force majeure, error in crossing a 
neutral frontier or other reason. This position was em-
bodied in the rules drawn up by the Con1mission of 
Jurists at The Hague in 1923 in article 40 which forbade 
to belligerent n1ilitary aircraft entrance to neutral 
jurisdiction. · 
The 24-hour rule.-Gradually there evolved a rule that 
the sa1ne regulations should be applied 'by neutrals to 
the vessels of war of each belligerent sojourning in the 
neutral port. As vessels of war changed in character, 
there 'vere varying proposals as to the length of time of 
per1nitted sojourn and of the interval between the sail-
ing of vessels of different nationalities. Even during 
the 'Vorld ~Var distinctions among different types of 
vessels were for a tin1e made. The Brazilian rules of 
August 4, 1914, contained the following provision : 
ART. 18th. If warships of two belligerents happen to be to-
gether in a Brazilian port or harbor, an interval of twenty-four 
hours shall elapse between the sailing of one of then1 and the 
sailing of her enemy, if both are stea1ners. If the first to sail is 
a sailing Yessel and the next being an enemy is a steamer, three 
c1ays' aclntnce will be given to the first belligerent ship. Their 
time of sailing will be counted from their respectiYe arrivals, 
exceptions being made for the cases in which a prolongation of 
stay 1nay be granted. A belligerent ship of war cannot leave a 
Brazilian port before the departure of a merchant ship under an 
enemy flag, but n1ust respect the aforesaid provisions concern-
ing the intervals of departure between steamers and sailing 
vessels. (1H16 Naval War College, International Law Topics, 
p. 12.) 
The rule comn1only called the 24-hour rule was gen-
erally accepted. By this rule 24 hours was the limit of 
sojourn of a belligerent vessel of war in a neutral port 
under ordinary circumstances and 24 hours must elapse 
between the departure of vessels of war of opposing 
belligerents. The reason for the establishing of this 
period 'vas that neither belligerent should be able to 
obtain an advantage over the other by entering neutral 
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ports. It ·was thought 24 hours of sailing time 'vould 
enable the leading vessel to reach a point "~here pursuit 
'vould be in1probable. 
1"'he sailing distance of a surface vessel in 24 hours 
'vould, ho,veYer, be a relatively short journey for an air-
craft. It 'vas early seen that the 24-hour rule 'vould not 
be practicable as bet,veen aircraft and of little use be-
t,veen air and surface craft. The only safe rule for the 
neutral 'vas soon discovered to be to prohibit entrance 
of aircraft and to intern any that transgressed this 
regulation. 
Resun~e.-""\Vhile the final issue of the effort to adjust 
Philippine relations is still ( 1933) uncertain, the plan 
set forth in the Act of January 17, 1933, is one of the 
most definite thus far proposed and seriously considered. 
This plan 'vould specially involYe the vie,ving of the Act . 
fron1 three points of vie,v. the attitude and consequences 
for ( 1) the United States; ( 2) the Philippine Islands; 
and ( 3) other states. 
The United States has in passing the Act of January 
17, 1933, over the President's veto, presumably set forth 
the policy 'vhich it is 'villing to pursue. This involves 
independence for the Islands after 10 years under speci-
fied conditions. 
1"'he Philippine Legislature has in failing to approve 
the conditions in the Act of January 17, 1933, indicated 
that the conditions are unsatisfactory and subsequently 
that certain a1nenchnents in the act 'Yere essential. 
Other states 'vould be interested in any changes 'vhich 
n1ight be 1nade in the status of the Philippine Islands be-
cause introducing ne'v factors into the international poli-
tics of the Pacific and Far East, 'vhere conditions are al-
ready uncertain. ""\Vhile so1ne for1n of neutralization 
1night involve less serious problen1s for a ti1ne than " ... ould 
independence " ... ithout such an agree1nent, there are still 
1nany problen1s even under neutralization if precedents 
can be Inn de a basis of jndgn1ent. X o" ... the relations are 
bet"~een the United States and foreign po,Yers. The ad-
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clitional relations which 'voulcl £ollo,v, i£ Philippine inde-
pendence is established, W'oulcl be these which arise 'vhen 
a ne'v state enters the £an1ily o£ nations. I£ neutraliza- . 
tion o£ the Philippine Islands eventuates, not 1nerely the 
Islands enter new' international relations but all the 
parties to the neutralization enter new relations to one 
another as well as to nonparticipating states. 
Further, it 1nay be questioned whether the Philippine 
Islands, on the frontier between the Eastern and Western 
''T oriels, 'vould feel assured o£ their independence 'vith-
out more definite sanctions than are ordinarily embodied 
in neutralization agree1nents. As states are not yet ac-
custoined to £ollo'v altruistic policies, it is doubtful 
w·hether there w·oulcl be sufficient advantages eventually 
flo,ving from the neutralization o£ the Islands to 'varrant 
commihnents 'vhich n1ight involve sacrifices on the part 
o£ the states -vvhose participation would be essential for 
effective neutralization. 
By the hypothesis o£ situation II the Philippine 
Islands have been granted their independence and this 
independence 1nay or 1nay not be accompanied by neu-
tralization. I£ the Philippine Islands are not neutral-
ized, all the rights and obligations of any state would 
reside in the Con1monw'ealth o£ the Philippine Islands. 
As regards seaplanes, general practice seems to recognize 
that a great degree o£ risk is involved in their Inove-
Inents and that a neutral has a corresponding obliga-
tion in controlling their 1noven1ents. Internment has 
co1ne to be regarded as the proper course o£ action on the_ 
part o£ a neutral. Other states may justly condition 
their action to a reasonable degree upon the effectiveness. 
o£ the action o£ the neutral. 
I£ the Co1n1nonwealth o£ the Philippine Islands is 
neutralized, the respective states parties to the neutraliza-
tion treaty will probably, judging £ro1n precedent, assume 
as little obligation as possible. The obligations o£ the 
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands remain as. 
'vould be the case without any neutralization treaty un-
less the treaty specifically provides otherwise. 
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SOLUTION 
1. In case the Philippine Islands obtain independence 
and are not neutralized: 
(a) The Philippine Government should intern the sea-
plane. 
(b) The Yamba may request assurances from the Phil-
ippine Government to the effect that the seaplane has 
been or immediately will be interned. 
(c) The Namba may inquire whether the seaplane has 
been or in11nediately is to be interned and may govern its 
movements accordingly. 
(d) The Usa has no legal concern with the matter. 
2. In case the Philippine Islands are neutralized: 
(a) The Philippine Government should intern the sea-
plane. 
(b) If state Y is a party to the neutralization treaty, 
the Y an~ba may perform such services as rest upon that 
vessel under the treaty, but if state Y is not a party to 
the treaty, even though other states may be parties, the 
Yamba Inay request assurances from the Philippine Gov-
ernment to the effect that the seaplane has been or in1-
mediately will be interned. 
( o) If state N is a party to the neutralization treaty, 
the Namba may perform such services as rest upon that 
vessel under the treaty, but if state N is not a party to 
the treaty, even though other states 1nay be parties, the 
Na1nba may inquire whether the seaplane has been or 
immediately is to be interned and may govern its n1ove-
ments accordingly. 
(d) If the United States is, as may be inferred fron1 
the Act of January 17, 1933, a party to the treaty of 
neutralization, the Usa may perforn1 such services as 
rest upon that vessel under the treaty, but if the United 
States is not a party, even though other states 1nay be 
parties, the Usa has no legal concern 'vith the 1natter. 
